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Open access under CC BY-NWe present a new dorsal–ventral stream framework for language comprehension which uniﬁes basic
neurobiological assumptions (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009) with a cross-linguistic neurocognitive sentence
comprehension model (eADM; Bornkessel & Schlesewsky, 2006). The dissociation between (time-depen-
dent) syntactic structure-building and (time-independent) sentence interpretation assumed within the
eADM provides a basis for the division of labour between the dorsal and ventral streams in comprehen-
sion. We posit that the ventral stream performs time-independent uniﬁcations of conceptual schemata,
serving to create auditory objects of increasing complexity. The dorsal stream engages in the time-depen-
dent combination of elements, subserving both syntactic structuring and a linkage to action. Further-
more, frontal regions accomplish general aspects of cognitive control in the service of action planning
and execution rather than linguistic processing. This architecture is supported by a range of existing
empirical ﬁndings and helps to resolve a number of theoretical and empirical puzzles within the existing
dorsal–ventral streams literature.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
The literature on the neuroscience of language has recently seen
an increasing interest in the dorsal and ventral streams as possible,
neurobiologically plausible streams of speech and language pro-
cessing.1 Evidence for this perspective has been gleaned from a
number of different domains, ranging from speech perception and
production (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004, 2007; Rauschecker & Scott,
2009) over word-level production and comprehension (Ueno, Saito,
Rogers, & Lambon Ralph, 2011) to syntactic processing (Friederici,
2009). An inherent appeal of the dual streams perspective is that it
may help to provide a neurobiological grounding for functionally
motivated models of the language architecture. In particular, as dual
streams of processing are well established within the literature on
the auditory system of non-human primates, they open up the pos-
sibility for highly appealing cross-species comparisons between hu-rmanic Linguistics, University
Germany. Fax: +49 (0)6421
nkessel-Schlesewsky).
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C-ND license. man speech and language and more general properties of auditory
processing (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009).
However, in spite of the relatively uniﬁed neuroanatomical per-
spective underlying these current dual streams approaches to lan-
guage (but see below for differing assumptions regarding possible
neuroanatomical sub-pathways and the characterisation of poster-
ior temporal regions), their interpretations of dorsal and ventral
stream functions in language processing are quite different from
one another. For example, based on studies of pseudoword produc-
tion versus sentence comprehension, Saur et al. (2008, p. 18035)
proposed that the dorsal stream mediates the ‘‘sensory-motor
mapping of sound to articulation’’, while the ventral stream is in-
volved in the ‘‘linguistic processing of sound to meaning’’. By con-
trast, Friederici (2009, 2012) draws upon results from sentence
comprehension to posit that part of the dorsal stream (speciﬁcally,
one dorsal sub-pathway) is crucial for the processing of ‘‘hierarchi-
cal’’ or ‘‘complex’’ syntax, whereas part of the ventral stream (one
ventral sub-pathway) is assumed to be involved in the processing
of ‘‘local’’ or ‘‘simple’’ syntax. Clearly, these alternative functional
proposals have very different implications for the interpretation
of the dorsal and ventral streams during language processing
and, thereby, for models of the neurobiology of language. However,
beyond these speciﬁc interpretations, are there possible unifying
(and meaningful) functional generalisations that dissociate one
stream from the other, irrespective of the possible existence of
neuroanatomical sub-pathways?
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ciﬁcally, we attempt to bring together some basic neurobiological
design principles regarding information processing within the
two streams (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009) with insights on the func-
tional architecture of sentence comprehension. We will argue that
the assumption of hierarchical processing – the sensitivity for
increasingly complex sets of feature combinations within neurons
or neuronal assemblies – as a basic principle of brain function
within the auditory system (as suggested by Rauschecker, 1998)2
can be fruitfully combined with well-established assumptions
regarding the timing of language comprehension. This assumed cor-
respondence between a neuroanatomical hierarchy and a temporal
hierarchy in information processing will be used as a basis for a
new spatio-temporal model of language processing within a dorsal
and ventral streams perspective.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 be-
gins by introducing some background assumptions from the
neurobiological domain and sentence comprehension in time and
space. Section 3 subsequently goes on to describe some puzzles
that arise if these background assumptions are adopted. Section 4
offers a possible solution to the puzzles described in Section 3 in
the form of a novel proposal regarding the neuroanatomical locus
of syntactic structure building and the form-to-meaning mapping
at the sentence level. Finally, Section 5 offers some conclusions.
2. Background assumptions
In this section, we will describe the assumptions on which our
line of argumentation will be based in the following sections. While
each of these assumptions can, presumably, be contended at some
level, it seems to us that they are all established sufﬁciently to war-
rant their use as premises of the account to be developed here.
2.1. Hierarchical organisation as a basic property of functional
neuroanatomy
On the basis of research on the visual (e.g. Felleman & Van Es-
sen, 1991) and, more recently, auditory systems (Rauschecker,
1998), we follow Rauschecker and Scott (2009) in assuming that
the functional neuronanatomy of information processing in the
brain is hierarchically organised:
Hierarchical organization in the cerebral cortex combines ele-
ments of serial as well as parallel processing: ‘lower’ cortical
areas with simpler receptive-ﬁeld organization, such as sensory
core areas, project to ‘higher’ areas with increasingly complex
response properties, such as belt, parabelt and PFC regions.
These complex properties are generated by convergence and
summation [. . .]. Parallel processing principles in hierarchical
organization are evident in that specialized cortical areas
(‘maps’) with related functions (corresponding to sub-modali-
ties or modules) are bundled into parallel processing ‘streams’.
(Rauschecker & Scott, 2009, p. 719)
Evidence for hierarchical organisation within the auditory sys-
tem stems from a variety of different sources. Using single cell
recordings in non-human primates (rhesus monkeys), Rauschecker
and colleagues found increasing sensitivity to more complex ‘‘audi-
tory objects’’ – from neurons responding mainly to speciﬁc fre-
quency bandwidths in lateral auditory belt areas to neurons2 Note that hierarchical processing in this sense is not to be confused with
hierarchical syntax in the sense of Friederici (2009). Friederici uses the term
‘‘hierarchical’’ to refer to particular types of syntactic structures, in contrast to the
neurobiological sense that is central here. For more detailed discussions of the two
senses of the term ‘‘hierarchical’’, see Sections 2 and 3 for the neurobiological and
Friederician sense, respectively.responding increasingly to species-speciﬁc vocalisations in more
anterior portions of the superior temporal gyrus (Rauschecker,
Tian, & Hauser, 1995). From these ‘‘increasing proportions of call-
selective neurons [. . .] from A1 to lateral belt to more anterior
superior temporal areas’’ (Rauschecker, 1998, p. 518), Rauschecker
proposed a hierarchical organisation of auditory processing that is
compatible with what is known about hierarchical processing
within the visual system. This perspective was recently corrobo-
rated by a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on language pro-
cessing, in which DeWitt and Rauschecker (2012) found evidence
for an anterior-directed processing gradient within temporal cor-
tex. Across 115 studies, phoneme versus word processing engen-
dered increasingly anterior activation within the superior
temporal gyrus (STG), and phrase-level processing correlated with
activation in the anterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). From
these ﬁndings, DeWitt and Rauschecker (2012) argue for a concor-
dance between the results on human language processing and the
literature on primate auditory processing, with both providing evi-
dence for hierarchical processing of auditory objects within a ven-
tral processing stream in superior temporal cortex.
Applyingthesebasicassumptions to languageprocessing–and, for
present purposes, sentence processing in particular –we arrive at the
following hypothesis: the functional neuroanatomy of the form-to-
meaningmapping shouldbe characterisedbyneuroanatomical gradi-
ents originating in primary auditory areas, which correlate with the
processing of successively more complex linguistic units.
2.2. Time–space correspondence
If we accept the premise that language processing is sup-
ported by a hierarchically organised auditory system (see Sec-
tion 2.1), this also has implications for the temporal
organisation of the form-to-meaning mapping in sentence pro-
cessing. Of course, connectivity within the brain is inherently
bidirectional. Nevertheless, the assumption of hierarchical orga-
nisation implies that there is a certain asymmetry in the ‘‘ﬂow’’
of information, since ‘‘lower’’ areas with simple feature sensitiv-
ity project to ‘‘higher’’ areas with a sensitivity to more complex
stimuli, resulting from the convergence and summation of prop-
erties from a number of ‘‘lower’’ areas (see the quote by Raus-
checker & Scott, 2009, in Section 2.1 above). DeWitt and
Rauschecker (2012, p. E509), too, refer to ‘‘a processing cascade
emanating from core areas, progressing both laterally, away from
core itself, and anteriorly, away from A1’’ in describing their ven-
tral stream of linguistic pattern recognition (i.e. language com-
prehension from the phonemic to the phrasal level). We thus
propose that insights on the organisation of the neuroanatomical
processing hierarchy should be compatible with ﬁndings on the
temporal organisation of sentence processing and vice versa.
This hypothesis can be exempliﬁed using the gradient of phone-
mic processing toword processing thatwas observed byDeWitt and
Rauschecker (2012): electrophysiological (i.e. scalp EEG) studies of
auditory word recognition in sentence context have provided evi-
dence for two mismatch-related negativities that occur when the
current input is incongruent with the prior sentence or discourse
context, an N200 and a following N400 (e.g. Connolly & Phillips,
1994; van den Brink, Brown, & Hagoort, 2001). Based on these re-
sults, even proponents of a highly interactive ‘‘one-step’’ model of
sentence-level interpretation (Hagoort, 2005; Hagoort & van Ber-
kum,2007) have argued for a cascade of informationprocessingdur-
ing sentence comprehension (Hagoort, 2008; van den Brink, Brown,
& Hagoort, 2006; van den Brink et al., 2001). According to this view,
word recognition comprises the activationof a cohort ofword candi-
dates (Marslen-Wilson, 1987; Marslen-Wilson & Welsh, 1978) in a
strictly bottom-up manner, with N200 effects emerging whenever
a form-based lexical candidate is not supported by the current
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to index a mismatch at the content level only, which can take place
when the meaning of a word is to be integrated with the prior con-
text (Hagoort, 2008). In addition to showinga clear temporal parallel
to theneuroanatomical gradientdiscussedabove, theseﬁndingsalso
make clear that the assumption of a processing hierarchy or cascade
does not contradict the central notion of bidirectionality. For both
the N200 and the N400, mismatches with top-down information
(i.e. information provided via feedback fromhigher-level contextual
representations) are crucial.Nevertheless, thehierarchical organisa-
tion fromsmaller (less complex) to larger (more complex)units is re-
ﬂected in the relative timing of the electrophysiological signals.3
In this paper, we examine the consequences of applying this as-
sumed ‘‘time–space correspondence’’ based on the notion of hierar-
chical processing to more general aspects of the form-to-meaning
mapping at the sentence level. To this end, we will draw upon in-
sights gleaned from our existing neurocognitive model of language
comprehension, the extended Argument Dependency Model
(eADM: Bornkessel & Schlesewsky, 2006; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky
& Schlesewsky, 2008a, 2009b), which assumes a cascaded organisa-
tion of the linguistic form-to-meaning mapping. The eADM appears
well suited to this purpose for at least two reasons: (a) the assump-
tion of an incremental, cascaded architecture which serves to com-
bine smaller units into larger ones draws upon aspects of both
serial and parallel processing and is thereby conceptually very sim-
ilar to the neuronanatomical notion of hierarchical processing dis-
cussed in Section 2.1; (b) the model is shaped by cross-linguistic
considerations (i.e. the question of which properties of the language
processing architecture generalise across the >6000 languages cur-
rently spoken and which are speciﬁc to individual languages) and
therebyclosely tied toneurobiology, since cross-linguistically recur-
ring properties are likely grounded in someway in the structure and
function of the human brain (Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesew-
sky, in press-a, in press-b).
2.3. The functional neuroanatomy of (auditory) language processing4
In accordance with the assumption that the dual-streams per-
spective provides a neurobiologically plausible basis for models3 Note that this notion of a time-space correspondence cannot be examined
directly using current experimental techniques (given the temporal insensitivity of
BOLD-fMRI and the inverse problem in EEG/MEG). It can, however, potentially be
achieved at the model level such that stages of information processing posited in one
of the two domains should also be applicable in the other. Importantly, this does not
imply that the absolute peak latencies of typical language-related ERP components
(e.g. the N400 or the N200) or the relative temporal distance between the latencies of
two components (e.g. N400 vs. P600) should be viewed as timing estimates for
processing times in particular brain regions/networks or the transfer of information
between them. Evidence for the assumption that ERP component latencies do not
reﬂect absolute processing times stems from several domains. On the one hand, eye
movement research has shown that a particular linguistic phenomenon (e.g. word
frequency) can be reﬂected in the eye movement record during reading at an earlier
point in time than in the ERP record (Rayner & Clifton, 2009; Sereno & Rayner, 2003).
On the other hand, research within the mismatch negativity paradigm also indicates
that many linguistic information sources already appear to be available at a
considerably earlier point in time than is suggested by typical language-related ERP
components such as the N400 (Pulvermüller, 2010). Nevertheless, the assumption
that the relative timing of different ERP components may provide evidence for the
hierarchical organisation of processing, has not been contradicted to date (for
discussion, see Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, 2009a). Thus, even though
ERP effects constitute rather macroscopic brain responses and thereby provide
evidence on a rather different level to other data types used to inform the
neurobiological dorsal and ventral streams literature (e.g. single cell recordings in
non-human primates), we posit that they are nevertheless informative with regard to
the functional (hierarchical) architecture of processing.
4 We conﬁne our assumptions to auditory sentence processing in the present paper
for the sake of simplicity, since visual processing involves processing pathways from
other primary sensory regions. We would, however, assume that the basic mecha-
nisms described here carry over to processing in the visual domain, though some
neuroanatomical modiﬁcations will clearly be required.of speech and language processing, the following discussion will
presuppose that the distinction between a dorsal and a ventral pro-
cessing stream provides us with a feasible functional model of
information transfer in the brain during the form-to-meaning
mapping at the sentence level. Furthermore, we posit that the dor-
sal versus ventral distinction is meaningful at a functional level, i.e.
that there is a common denominator in terms of function for the
dorsal versus ventral stream irrespective of whether or not there
are additional anatomical sub-pathways within each stream (e.g.
Catani, Jones, & ffytche, 2005; Friederici, 2012; Glasser & Rilling,
2008). This means that there should be differences in the type(s)
of information transferred along each stream and/or in the mech-
anisms of information processing. Of course, this is only a hypoth-
esis (for an opposing view, which posits heterogeneous functions
within each stream, see Friederici, 2011, 2012), but – assuming
that the terms ‘‘dorsal’’ and ‘‘ventral’’ are to remain meaningful
at a functional as well as a neuroanatomical level – it appears
worth pursuing for reasons of parsimony.
With regard to our neuroanatomical assumptions, two further
clariﬁcations are in order. Firstly, for the anatomical grounding of
the two streams, we draw upon Rauschecker and Scott’s (2009) no-
tion of an ‘‘antero-ventral’’ and a ‘‘postero-dorsal’’ pathway,
respectively. Crucially, this implies that the anatomical pathways
are not conﬁned to long-distance projections from temporal to
frontal regions (via ﬁbre bundles such as the arcuate fascicle or
the extreme capsule), but already originate within the temporal
lobe and – as demonstrated in monkeys – even within auditory
cortex (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009; Tian, Reser, Durham, Kustov,
& Rauschecker, 2001). Thus, in accordance with hierarchical pro-
cessing, we hypothesise that neuroanatomical processing gradi-
ents should be observable within temporal cortex, ‘‘emanating’’
from primary auditory regions (for evidence regarding similar con-
nectivity between primary auditory areas (Heschl’s gyrus) and
anterior and posterior temporal regions, respectively, in humans,
see Upadhyay et al., 2008). These should show an anterior direc-
tionality within the antero-ventral pathway on the one hand and
a posterior directionality within the postero-dorsal pathway on
the other.
Secondly, in accordance with the tenets of hierarchical process-
ing, there is an asymmetry in the directionality of information
transfer in spite of the obvious presence of bidirectional connec-
tions. From this perspective, it appears legitimate to refer to
streams/pathways ‘‘emanating’’ from auditory cortex and project-
ing to frontal regions. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we
will therefore sometimes use terms such as ‘‘upstream’’ and
‘‘downstream’’ to refer to regions closer to and further away from
primary auditory areas, respectively, within the processing
streams/pathways (for a similar terminology, see DeWitt & Raus-
checker, 2012; Mesulam, 1998).
2.4. The temporo-spatial hypothesis of the dorsal and ventral streams
Taking the basic assumptions outlined in Sections 2.1–2.3
together, we arrive at the following basic research hypothesis:(1) The temporo-spatial hypothesis (TSH) of the dorsal and
ventral streams
Language processing involves the spread of activation
along the dorsal and ventral streams. The two streams
are instantiated anatomically by an antero-ventral and a
postero-dorsal pathway, respectively, both of which
emanate from primary auditory regions and project – via
anterior temporal and posterior temporal/parietal
regions, respectively – to frontal cortex. The streams
serve separable functions of information processing and a
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irrespective of the possible presence of multiple
anatomical subpathways. Information sources that are
taken into account earlier in time during processing are
processed further upstream in neuroanatomical terms
than information sources that are taken into account later.5 The early timing of syntactic information is apparent, for example, from ERP
studies on sentence comprehension. These have revealed that, when a syntactic
problem is encountered at an earlier point in time in the speech stream (e.g. induced
via a preﬁx) than a following semantic error (e.g. induced via the word stem), the ERP
response to the semantic error is modulated in comparison to when it occurs on its
own (Hahne & Friederici, 2002). By contrast, when the temporal availability of the
two information sources is reversed (e.g. when the semantic problem is induced via
the word stem and the syntactic problem via a sufﬁx), the ERP response to the
syntactic error is comparable to that elicited when the syntactic error occurs on its
own (van den Brink & Hagoort, 2004). This asymmetry provides compelling evidence
in favour of a cascaded information processing architecture, with syntactic (i.e.
category sequence) information available early within the cascade (for a more
detailed exposition of this argument, see Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky,
2009a). Note that we motivate the cascade in terms of the modulating inﬂuence of
one information type on another rather than in terms of absolute ERP component
latencies, since typical language-related ERP components such as the N400 likely do
not provide accurate absolute timing estimates (see Footnote 3). Importantly, work
within the mismatch negativity (MMN) paradigm also supports the assumption of
cascaded processing (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Hauk, 2009), though at considerably
shorter latencies (with phonological, lexical and syntactic, as well as semantic
information – in that cascaded order – modulating ERP responses within the ﬁrst 200
ms post word onset). Nevertheless, as MMN studies require a rather artiﬁcal language
processing paradigm with many repetitions of minimally varying standard and
deviant stimuli, we would also be cautious in adopting these latency values as
estimates of absolute timing in natural language processing.
6 Note again that this assumption does not contradict the bidirectionality of the
streams (see Section 2.2 for detailed discussion).The TSH posits that the assumption of hierarchical processing,
which has been demonstrated for the antero-ventral pathway in
both the primate auditory system and in human speech and lan-
guage processing (DeWitt & Rauschecker, 2012; Rauschecker,
1998; Rauschecker & Scott, 2009; Rauschecker et al., 1995), also
applies to the postero-dorsal pathway during language compre-
hension. In other words: the dorsal stream, too, has the function
of combining elements/features to form successively more com-
plex representations, but the nature of these representations dif-
fers fundamentally from those constructed within the ventral
stream. This is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel claim, since
existing approaches stress the role of the dorsal stream in audi-
tory-motor mappings and, thereby, particularly speech produc-
tion (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004, 2007; Saur et al., 2008; Ueno
et al., 2011). Rauschecker and Scott (2009) do envisage the dor-
sal pathway as supporting speech processing in general (i.e.
involving both production and perception, switching between
forward and inverse models in auditory-motor linkage), but do
not provide a detailed speciﬁcation of comprehension mecha-
nisms. In Friederici’s account, which assumes that one dorsal
sub-pathway (and, in her view, functional sub-stream) is in-
volved in the comprehension of syntactically complex sentences
(Friederici, 2009, 2011, 2012), this pathway is viewed essentially
as a top-down connection: ‘‘the dorsal back-projection from BA
44 to posterior STG/STS [. . .] subserve[s] top-down processes rel-
evant for the assignment of grammatical relations’’ (Friederici,
2012, p. 263).
In the remainder of the paper, we will provide a twofold moti-
vation for the assumption of hierarchical processing within the
dorsal stream in sentence comprehension – which will likely prove
to be one of the more controversial claims advanced here. Firstly,
we will discuss a number of existing puzzles in the dorsal–ventral
streams literature which, in our view, challenge at least certain as-
pects of current accounts (Section 3). Secondly, we will argue on
the basis of existing ﬁndings on sentence comprehension across
languages that, in addition to the hierarchically organised repre-
sentations processed within the ventral stream, the form-to-mean-
ing mapping requires a second type of representation which
crucially involves the ordering of elements in time, and that the
dorsal stream provides a neurobiologically plausible architectural
locus for the processing of this second information type (Section 4).
3. Puzzles
3.1. The locus of syntax within a dorsal–ventral streams architecture
All current psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic models of sen-
tence processing essentially agree upon two things: (a) syntactic
rules/representations are involved in sentence processing; and
(b) syntactic information is taken into account early during the
comprehension process (e.g. Bornkessel & Schlesewsky, 2006; Fra-
zier & Clifton, 1996; Friederici, 2002; Hagoort, 2005; MacDonald,
Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Pulvermüller, 2010; Vosse &
Kempen, 2000). Note that this applies not only to so-called ‘‘syn-
tax-ﬁrst’’ models, but also to interactive or constraint-based mod-
els (e.g. Hagoort, 2005; MacDonald et al., 1994; Vosse & Kempen,
2000): while the latter posit that non-syntactic information
sources are taken into consideration at the same time as syntactic
information, they do not assume that syntactic processing is de-layed vis-à-vis other information types.5 At the same time, and in
spite of differing fundamentally with regard to the details, most cur-
rent neurocognitive models of language processing at the sentence
level assume that Broca’s region (i.e. the pars opercularis and triang-
ularis of the left inferior frontal gyrus, lIFG) is somehow involved in
syntactic processing (Baggio & Hagoort, 2011; Friederici, 2002, 2009;
Hagoort, 2003, 2005; Ullman, 2001, 2004). Friederici (2012, p. 265)
even refers to BA 44 as the ‘‘core syntax region’’.
In Section 2.2, we proposed that the dorsal–ventral streams per-
spective in conjunction with the well-established assumption of
hierarchical processing leads to a notion of ‘‘time–space correspon-
dence’’. If true, and assuming that the psycholinguistic results
regarding the status of syntax as a relatively basic and early infor-
mation source hold, the perspective that inferior frontal cortex is
crucially involved in syntactic structure-building appears some-
what surprising. Frontal cortex (including inferior frontal regions,
but also other frontal areas such as premotor cortex) constitutes
the point of convergence between the two streams and is thereby
essentially the furthest possible point downstream from primary
auditory cortex (PAC) within each stream (and even if one does
not accept our proposal regarding hierarchical processing during
sentence comprehension within the dorsal stream, this still holds
true for the ventral stream).6 By contrast, time–space correspon-
dence would lead one to predict that syntax is processed in networks
that are still relatively far upstream within the processing streams
and thereby quite close to primary sensory cortices.
The problems arising froman association between syntax and infe-
rior frontal cortex have, of course, already been noted. Thus, a number
of scholars have argued that Broca’s region is engaged in processes of
cognitive control during language processing, rather than in linguistic
computationper se (e.g. Stowe,Haverkort,&Zwarts, 2005;Stoweetal.,
1998; Thompson-Schill, Bedny, & Goldberg, 2005; Thompson-Schill,
D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). These arguments have been ex-
tended speciﬁcally to syntax in studies demonstrating an increase of
lIFG activation for sentences involving ambiguity and, hence, an in-
creased need to select among competing alternatives (Novick, True-
swell, & Thompson-Schill, 2005). It has further been demonstrated
that this activation overlaps with activation elicited in a classic cogni-
tive control paradigm (the Stroop task; January, Trueswell, & Thomp-
son-Schill, 2009). Based on differing inferior frontal activation
patterns for distinct types of word order variations, we have also re-
cently argued (Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, Grewe, & Schlesewsky,
Fig. 1. Schematic depiction of the model proposed here. Panel A provides a basic overview of the neuroanatomical assumptions: both the ventral (dashed line) and dorsal
(solid line) streams are assumed to emanate from primary auditory cortex (PAC) and to perform information processing in a hierarchically organised manner. Thus, though
the streams are bidirectional, there is an inherent asymmetry in the directionality of information ﬂow on account of the hierarchical organisation. Note that the ﬁgure
abstracts away from possible neuroanatomical sub-pathways within the two streams. Panel B shows the assumed structure of hierarchical processing within the two streams.
For further details on actor-event (AE) schema activation/identiﬁcation, see Fig. 2. For further details on AE-schema uniﬁcation, see Fig. 3. For further details on syntactic
structure building, see Fig. 4. Note 1: Control functions of inferior frontal cortex in language comprehension are assumed to be organised in a functional-neuroanatomical
gradient; for a more detailed discussion of the inner structure of the processing architecture in inferior frontal cortex, see Bornkessel-Schlesewsky et al. (2012) and
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky (2012).
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sky & Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, 2013) that the phenomena summa-
rised by Friederici (2009) under the label ‘‘hierarchical syntax’’ are
moreparsimoniouslyexplained in termsofagradientof cognitive con-
trol inprefrontal cortex in thesenseofKoechlinandcolleagues (Koech-
lin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Koechlin & Summerﬁeld, 2007). This
control-basedperspectiveon lIFG functionduring languageprocessing
is perfectly compatible with (a) hierarchical processing, since control
providesanaturaloverarching functional interfacebetween linguistics
representations and behaviour; and (b) the assumed time–space-cor-
respondence, since it implies that ‘‘true’’ syntactic computation must
take place further upstream than in inferior frontal cortex.
If we are to look for syntax further upstream, the crucial ques-
tion is, of course, where. In this regard, the anterior temporal lobe
(aTL) appears to be the best candidate given the current state of the
art in the ﬁeld. However, since the aTL forms part of the ventralstream, we shall discuss this issue in more detail as part of Puzzle
number 2 in the following subsection.
3.2. What is the role of the ventral stream: syntax, concepts or both?
In the existing literature, there appear to be two main views on
the functional signiﬁcance of the ventral stream during language
processing. Motivated by observations at the sentence and word
level, respectively, some researchers have emphasised the impor-
tance of basic combinatorics, while others have focused on the
extraction of meaning from a linguistic form. Since both of these
views crucially hinge upon the role of the aTL, we will also focus
primarily upon this region in the following.
The aTL has long been under discussion as a possible locus of struc-
turingoperationsat thesentence-level, since it showsincreasedactiva-
tion for sentences versus word lists (Bottini et al., 1994; Friederici,
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Xu,Kemeny, Park, Frattali, &Braun, 2005).More recentﬁndings indeed
appear to support amorespeciﬁc roleof theaTL in sentence-level com-
binatorics as demonstrated, for example, by contrasting minimal lin-
guistic phrases with word pairs not allowing for syntactic/semantic
composition (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011) or by assessing parametric
changes in brain activity associated with measures of syntactic com-
plexity (Brennan et al., 2012). Accordingly, Hickok and Poeppel
(2007) assume that the anterior middle temporal gyrus (aMTG) and
anterior inferior temporal sulcus (aITS) as subregions of the aTL consti-
tute a ‘‘combinatory network’’ that forms part of the ventral stream. In
Friederici’s (2009) model, one ventral stream/pathway, including the
aTL, is thought to be involved in ‘‘local’’ syntactic combinatorics,
amounting essentially to the building of phrases (e.g. a noun phrase
suchas ‘‘thehamster’’ fromadeterminerandanoun) (Friederici, 2009).
From a different perspective to the one just discussed, the ventral
stream has been proposed as a stream for extracting semantics in
language understanding (e.g. Saur et al., 2008; Scott, Blank, Rosen,
& Wise, 2000; Ueno et al., 2011; and, to a certain degree, Hickok &
Poeppel, 2007). From the perspective of a neurocomputational dor-
sal–ventral streams model, for example, Ueno et al. (2011) state:
Given its proximity to the semantic-based representations of
the vATL, the functioning of the ventral pathway becomes dom-
inated by the inputM semanticM output mappings which are
doubly computationally challenging in that the mappings are
both arbitrary in form and require transforming between
time-varying (acoustic-phonology-motor) and time-invariant
(semantic) representations [. . .]. (Ueno et al., 2011, p. 392)
Evidence for this concept or comprehension based view of the ven-
tral stream stems (a) from robust ﬁndings of semantic dementia asso-
ciatedwith lesions to or atrophy of the aTL (see Ueno et al., 2011); and
(b) from the observation of increased ventral stream involvement in
language comprehension as opposed to production (Saur et al., 2008).
How, then, do these different – and seemingly incompatible –
perspectives on the ventral stream ﬁt together? At least two types
of suggestions have been put forward in this regard:
(a) The ‘‘parallel solution’’. In Friederici’s (2009, 2011, 2012)
view, which equates functional streams with anatomical
(sub-)pathways, the apparent incompatibility is resolved
by the assumption that there is no one ‘‘ventral stream’’ with
a uniﬁed function in speech and language processing.
Rather, Friederici (2009, 2011, 2012) suggests that there
are two ventral streams/pathways, one of which (‘‘ventral
pathway I’’) engages in semantic processing (connecting
the mid MTG/STG to anterior IFG via the extreme capsule;
Saur et al., 2008), while the other (‘‘ventral pathway II’’) sup-
ports local syntactic structure building (connecting the aTL
to the FOP via the uncinate fascicle). In this approach, the
two ventral streams/pathways thus support the form-to-
meaning mapping by performing semantic and syntactic
computations, respectively.77 It is, however, not clear how Friederici’s anatomical assumptions regarding
parallel ventral pathways for syntactic and semantic processing map onto the
temporal assumptions of her processing model. With regard to the time course of
processing, local syntactic structure building (‘‘simple syntax’’) is assumed to
constitute a functional prerequisite for semantic processing (Friederici, 1999, 2002,
2011). Thus, information processing in ventral pathway I (semantics) must build upon
the computations accomplished by ventral pathway II (local syntax). However,
Friederici (2012) does not appear to envisage ventral pathway II as bidirectional (see
her Fig. 1, in which ventral pathway II, the connection between aSTG and FOP, is one
of the very few connections that is depicted as unidirectional). This conﬂict between
the temporal and neuroanatomical dimensions could be resolved by assuming that
feedback from frontal cortex to the aTL via ventral pathway II is a prerequisite for
semantic processing in ventral pathway I. However, this would require giving up the
assumption of a hierarchical organisation in functional–neuroanatomical terms.(b) The ‘‘sequential solution’’. Hickok and Poeppel (2007) suggest
that the ventral stream consists of a ‘‘lexical interface’’ in the
posterior temporal lobe (pMTG/pITS) followed by ‘‘combinato-
rial processing’’ in the aTL (aMTG/aITS). They thus posit that
both lexical/conceptual and combinatory processing take place
within the ventral stream, but that they do so in successive
processing steps. Note, however, that Hickok and Poeppel’s
anatomical deﬁnition of the ventral pathway is somewhat dif-
ferent to that in other proposals and to the view assumed here
in that they assume an initial projection from primary auditory
areas to posterior temporal regions within this stream prior to
information transfer to the aTL.
However, neither of these potential solutions succeeds in ﬁnd-
ing a possible common denominator between combinatorics and
conceptual processing and, thus, in deﬁning a unifying functional
interpretation of the ventral stream. As already noted in Section 2.3,
it is of course an empirical question whether there is indeed such a
common denominator (and Friederici’s approach clearly negates
this assumption). Nevertheless, as outlined above, we consider it
a worthy enterprise to examine whether it might be possible to
formulate such a common functional denominator. One could, of
course, attempt to bridge the different domains by positing a very
broad unifying function such as ‘‘language comprehension’’ (as op-
posed to production via the dorsal stream). Yet, an explanation
along these lines in turn raises some potentially concerning ques-
tions about the role of the dorsal stream in language comprehen-
sion. These will be the subject of the next puzzle.
3.3. (Why) do we need a dorsal stream for language comprehension?
Returning to the sequential and parallel solutions for the ventral
stream that were discussed in the last subsection, both approaches
have in common that they situate both combinatory and semantic
processing within the ventral pathway. Thus, in spite of their differ-
ences, the two accounts face a similar problem: (Why) do we need a
dorsal pathway for language comprehension? If both combinatory
and conceptual aspects of the comprehension process are handled
within the ventral stream, then this should be sufﬁcient for compre-
hension in general. Additional processes appear superﬂuous.
Prima facie, Friederici’s parallel account of the ventral stream
offers a potential solution to this problem: The dorsal stream
(more precisely, dorsal pathway II8) only comes into play during
the comprehension of syntactically complex sentences (i.e. sen-
tences involving either (an) embedded clause(s) or deviations from
the basic word order). However, this approach is subject to both con-
ceptual and empirical problems. Conceptually, how does the pro-
cessing system determine whether a sentence is ‘‘simple’’ or
‘‘complex’’ syntactically? Is there a threshold which controls
whether a particular sentence or part of a sentence should be pro-
cessed via the ventral stream only or whether dorsal stream involve-
ment is required and, if so, how and where is this decision made? In
the latest version of Friederici’s account (Friederici, 2012), the bur-
den of these ‘‘decisions’’ appears to be placed on BA 44, which is de-
scribed as playing ‘‘a particular role in creating argument hierarchies
as a sentence is computed’’ and as the ‘‘core syntax region’’ (Frieder-
ici, 2012, p. 265). From this perspective, BA 44 would seem to pro-
vide the crucial interface between simple and complex syntax on8 As for the ventral stream, Friederici assumes two functionally and anatomically
separable dorsal sub-pathways. Dorsal pathway I, which connects the posterior
temporal lobe to the premotor cortex via the arcuate fascicle (AF)/superior longitu-
dinal fascicle (SLF) corresponds to the dorsal stream assumed to perform auditory-
motor mappings in other accounts (e.g. Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Rauschecker & Scott,
2009; Saur et al., 2008; Ueno et al., 2011). Dorsal pathway II, which is crucial here,
provides a connection between the posterior temporal lobe and BA 44 (also via the
AF/SLF) and, in Friederici’s view, is crucial for the processing of complex syntax.
9 This assumption, while not shared by mainstream Chomskyan generative
grammar, is widely held otherwise in grammatical theories, e.g. in Lexical Functional
Grammar (Bresnan, 2001), Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin, 2005), Jackend-
off’s tripartite approach (Jackendoff, 2002) and the simpler syntax framework
(Culicover & Jackendoff, 2005). This separation has: (a) been argued to be more
adequate for the analysis of different languages, including languages with vastly
different characteristics from English (Van Valin & LaPolla, 1997); and (b) been shown
to be computationally tractable in computational linguistics applications (for a recent
overview of computational applications of Lexical Functional Grammar, see Forst,
2011). In the domain of language processing, and speciﬁcally of neurocognitive
models of language comprehension, it has been advocated most strongly within the
extended Argument Dependency model (eADM), a model which aspires to account for
cross-linguistic similarities and differences in the neural bases for language process-
ing at the sentence level (Bornkessel & Schlesewsky, 2006; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky &
Schlesewsky, 2008a, 2009b). It is also inherent, to some degree, to the uniﬁcation-
based philosophy of Hagoort’s Memory, Uniﬁcation and Control (MUC) framework
(Hagoort, 2003, 2005), though the syntactic representations assumed by Hagoort
(based on Vosse & Kempen, 2000) do include functional nodes such as ‘‘subject’’ and
‘‘object’’.
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cessing on the other. However, Friederici also emphasises the central
role of the connectivity provided by her dorsal pathway II in allow-
ing for the processing of syntactically complex sentences on the ba-
sis of developmental studies (Brauer, Anwander, & Friederici, 2011).
The crucial argument here is that, in contrast to dorsal pathway I,
dorsal pathway II matures relatively slowly and that this correlates
with problems in the processing of word order variations in children.
Assuming that the primary role of Friederici’s dorsal pathway II
lies in allowing for the processing of syntactically complex sen-
tences (as claimed in Friederici, 2009, 2011), this approach is chal-
lenged empirically by the observation of activation changes within
the dorsal stream even in simple sentences, i.e. sentences without
embeddings and adhering to basic word order. These have been ob-
served, for example, in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)
in response to increased role assignment demands (‘‘who is acting
onwhom?) (Bornkessel, Zysset, Friederici, von Cramon, & Schlesew-
sky, 2005; Grewe et al., 2007) and the posterior superior temporal
gyrus (pSTG) for aspects of verb-argument structure processing
(Shetreet, Palti, Friedman, & Hadar, 2007). In the latest version of
her approach, Friederici (2012) addresses this problem by positing
that dorsal pathway II may also be involved in ‘‘deliver[ing] predic-
tions to theposterior temporal cortex in a top-downmanner’’ (Fried-
erici, 2012, p. 265) (e.g. regarding verb valency based on the number
of arguments already encountered). It also provides the necessary
prerequisite for syntax-semantics integration, which she envisages
as takingplace in posterior temporal cortex, by allowing for an infor-
mation ﬂow of syntactic information from BA 44 to the temporal
lobe. While these assumptions provide a potential explanation for
whydorsal streamactivation shouldalsobeobserved in the compre-
hensionof syntactically simple sentences, they also raisemoreques-
tions. In particular, how do young children accomplish syntax-
semantics integration and the processing of valency information if
their dorsal pathway II has not yet matured sufﬁciently for the pro-
cessing of complex syntax? Also, if dorsal pathway II is also crucially
involved in the processing of syntactically simple sentences, does
this not undermine the assumption of a functional separation be-
tween a ventral and a dorsal pathway for processing simple versus
complex syntax, respectively? In Section 4.2 below, we outline an
alternative view of syntactic processing within a dorsal–ventral
streams perspective that circumvents some of these problems.
Theobservationof comprehension-relatedactivationchangeswith-
in the dorsal stream also challenges the sequential account of the ven-
tral stream (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; see Section 3.2) as well as all
proposals of a principled dichotomy between production and compre-
hension in the dorsal versus ventral streams (Saur et al., 2008; Ueno
et al., 2011). Hickok and Poeppel (2007) address this issue by assuming
that posterior temporal regions in fact form part of the ventral stream
(asnotedabove); thus, comprehension-relatedactivations inthesepos-
terior temporal regions are to be expected in their account. Their pro-
posal does not, however, explain comprehension-related activations
near the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) or in parietal cortex.
In summary, existing accounts do not provide a satisfactory
explanation for why we seem to require a dorsal stream for the
comprehension of even simple sentences.
4. A new model
In the following, we will outline a proposal that, in our view,
could potentially provide a uniﬁed interpretation of the results at
the word and sentence levels and, thereby, address the puzzles
outlined in the previous section. Empirically, the main puzzle ap-
pears to be why we see dorsal stream activation even in the com-
prehension of simple sentences. We will claim that this
observation can be explained if we assume that both the ventral
and dorsal streams generally engage in sentence comprehension,but with differing functions. How, then, might one characterise
the differing representations or mechanisms involved? A closer
look at the computations thought to be performed by the dorsal
and ventral streams reveals the following. Time-dependent pro-
cessing is typically associated with the dorsal stream, e.g. in terms
of ‘‘encoding and storing sound sequences’’ (Scott & Wise, 2004, p.
27) or in supporting working memory (Saur et al., 2008). The ven-
tral stream, by contrast, is viewed as more time-independent in
most approaches (cf. Rauschecker’s auditory objects perspective
that was discussed in detail above, or the reference to time-invari-
ant semantic representations in Section 3.2; Ueno et al., 2011).
Thus, the basic subdivision between time-independent versus
time-dependent processing in the ventral and dorsal streams,
respectively, is one key insight underlying our approach. The sec-
ond is that this subdivision can be couched naturally within an
architecture that brings together insights gleaned from time-sensi-
tive, cross-linguistic investigations of sentence processing (Born-
kessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, 2009b) with Rauschecker’s
central neurobiological assumption of hierarchical processing
within the auditory system (Rauschecker, 1998; Rauschecker &
Scott, 2009). Note that, although our arguments will be based en-
tirely upon speech and language processing, we do not mean to
suggest that the proposed mechanisms (hierarchical processing
and the crucial distinction between time-dependent and time-
independent information processing) are exclusive to language.
Rather, we would assume (see also Footnote 12) that these mech-
anisms are compatible with domain-general functions of informa-
tion processing within the two streams.
The principal claims of our proposal are as follows (for further
elaboration of each claim, see the following subsections):
(a) Hierarchical processing in the ventral and dorsal streams. We
assume that information processing within both the ventral
and the dorsal streams is organised hierarchically (emanat-
ing from PAC and projecting antero-ventrally and postero-
dorsally), but that it subserves differing functions in the
form-to-meaning mapping.
(b) Time-independent (ventral) versus time-dependent (dorsal)
computations. While sentences may be considered (relatively
large) auditory objects and their recognition as such is thus
plausibly mediated by the ventral stream, they are also
sequences of categories encountered in time. We propose
that this time-dependent aspect of sentence processing is
accomplished by the dorsal stream. This principled separa-
tion is in accordance with the cross-linguistically motivated
proposal within the eADM that syntax (category sequences)
and sentential semantics are logically independent of one
another (Bornkessel & Schlesewsky, 2006; Bornkessel-Schle-
sewsky & Schlesewsky, 2008a, 2009b).9
10 Nevertheless, we assume that the switch from one action to another of the same
type is associated with some cost (which would manifest itself, for example, as an
increased N400 effect in electrophysiological terms). For further details, see Appendix
A.
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dent identiﬁcation and uniﬁcation of conceptual schemata,
serving to represent conceptual chunks of increasing size.
The property of time-independence refers to the fact that
schema combination (uniﬁcation) is not dependent upon
the sequence in which the schemata are activated.
(d) The function of the dorsal stream lies in the identiﬁcation and
combination of successively larger linguistic chunks in time.
This comprises the prosodic segmentation of the input and
the subsequent combination of elements into category
sequences. In addition, it involves the computation of all
time-dependent sentence internal relations (e.g. computing
which participant is the actor, i.e. the participant primarily
responsible for the state of affairs described).
(e) Frontal cortex does not subserve linguistic processing functions.
In accordance with the notion of hierarchical processing, we
propose that linguistic processing per se only takes place in
temporal and parietal regions, but not in frontal cortex.
Frontal cortex subserves control functions only and serves
to link linguistic processing to behaviour. Moreover, it serves
to integrate information from the ventral and dorsal streams
and to provide top-down feedback information to each
stream.
The overall architecture resulting from these assumptions is
shown in Fig. 1.
As is apparent from Fig. 1, the ventral stream in our proposal
is responsible for the identiﬁcation of ‘‘actor-event schemata’’
and their uniﬁcation. As we will describe in more detail below,
these schemata essentially correspond to category-neutral
semantic representations at the word level. In our approach,
they are thereby the key auditory objects that are identiﬁed
and combined hierarchically to form further auditory objects of
increasing internal complexity. Thus, the ventral stream is
responsible for building up a sentence-level semantic representa-
tion. In accordance with the basic assumptions of the eADM (and
of several theories of grammar, see Footnote 9), we posit that
this proceeds independently of and in parallel to the establish-
ment of a syntactic (constituent) structure. Our assumptions
can therefore be formulated at two distinct levels. In general
terms, we claim that the ventral stream is responsible for the
identiﬁcation of conceptually meaningful auditory objects of
increasing complexity (operationalised here via the uniﬁcation
of conceptual schemata). In more speciﬁc terms, we posit that
the schemata involved in this process have particular properties
(see below and, in particular, Appendix A).
The dorsal stream, by contrast, is responsible for the time-dependent
combination of elements, including segmentation into prosodic units
(prosodic words), their combination into a syntactic representation and
understanding the action described. Finally, the two streams are inte-
grated in frontal cortex (premotor cortex and inferior frontal gyrus,
IFG); we further assume that these frontal regions are responsible for
resolvingconﬂictsbetweenstreams. Inthefollowingsubsections,wewill
describe the different components of themodel inmore detail aswell as
empirical evidence supporting them.
4.1. Identifying and combining auditory objects in the ventral stream:
Actor-event schemata
If the typical view that the ventral stream processes time-inde-
pendent (or time-invariant) representations is correct, this stream
– by deﬁnition – cannot compute syntactic representations.
Accordingly, we claim that there is no need to assume syntactic
processing within the ventral stream. How, then, might we account
for combinatory effects within the ventral stream (see Section 3.2)?
We posit that these follow straightforwardly from the assumptionthat sentences are merely complex auditory objects that are con-
structed via the combination of less complex auditory objects (cf.
DeWitt & Rauschecker, 2012). This can be accomplished by means
of relatively simple schemata, which we term actor-event (AE)
schemata. These schemata, which are illustrated in Fig. 2, are sui-
ted for the purposes of auditory object identiﬁcation at the word
level and above, because they (a) provide word-level semantic
information as well as idiosyncratic lexical restrictions; and (b) al-
low for schema combination via uniﬁcation, i.e. in a time-indepen-
dent manner in accordance with the functional designation of the
ventral stream.
AE-schemata have several crucial characteristics: they are cate-
gory neutral (i.e. not designated as nouns or verbs, for example);
they are also actor-centred, as the name suggests (i.e. focus more
strongly on the person or thing responsible for the event than
the other event participants). Both assumptions are based on the-
oretical and empirical motivations and are formulated to ensure
applicability across typologically different languages. However,
since the more general claim – namely that the time-independent
identiﬁcation and combination of conceptual schemata follows
naturally from the speciﬁcation of the ventral stream assumed
here – is most central for present purposes, these more speciﬁc
assumptions will be described and motivated in more detail in
Appendix A.
AE-schemata are uniﬁed with one another to provide more
complex semantic representations. Schema uniﬁcation thus allows
for semantic combinatorics at the phrasal and sentential levels.
Fig. 3 provides some examples of AE-schemata created via uniﬁca-
tion during incremental sentence comprehension. In a nutshell,
uniﬁcation occurs by incorporating one schema into a slot (e.g.
‘‘who’’ or ‘‘what’’) of another. As in standard deﬁnitions of uniﬁca-
tion (see e.g. Pollard & Sag, 1994), this is possible when the slot is
either currently unﬁlled (e.g. Fig. 3D, in which ‘‘the girl’’ is uniﬁed
with the previously unﬁlled ‘‘with whom’’ slot of the schema in
Fig. 3A) or when there is a principled compatibility between the
previous representation and the new representation (e.g. Fig. 3B,
in which the ‘‘paint’’ schema in the ‘‘what’’ slot is replaced by
‘‘kiss’’, which is possible because the two share the same action
type).10 Further details on AE-schema uniﬁcation, including detailed
descriptions of the examples in Fig. 3, are provided in Appendix A.
The conception of AE-schemata and their uniﬁcation provides a
uniﬁed explanation for the two seemingly disparate functions of
the ventral stream in previous work, namely the mapping from
(auditory) form tomeaning and the combinatorics of linguistic enti-
ties, respectively. As AE-schemata are complete word-level seman-
tic representations, it is clear how their identiﬁcation during
language processing can account for the form-to-meaningmapping
at the word level, thus explaining the ﬁndings by Saur et al. (2008),
DeWitt and Rauschecker (2012) and the results on semantic demen-
tia (Ueno et al., 2011). Furthermore, AE uniﬁcation accounts for the
various data that have been cited as evidence for combinatory struc-
ture in the ATL: increased activation of this region for (i) sentences
versusword lists (Bottini et al., 1994; Friederici et al., 2000;Mazoyer
et al., 1993; Stowe et al., 1998; Xu et al., 2005); (ii) words encoun-
tered as part of a phrase as opposed to a non-combinatory context
(Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011); (iii) syntacticallymore versus less com-
plex sentences as deﬁned via word-by-word measures on various
complexity metrics (Brennan et al., 2012); and (iv) category viola-
tions at the phrasal level (Friederici, 2002, for a review). Observa-
tions (i) through (iii) are relatively straightforward in that they can
all be explained in terms of more versus less uniﬁcation operations
Fig. 2. Sample actor-event schemata (AE-schemata). For details, see the main text and, in particular, Appendix A.
(A) (B)
(C) (D)
Fig. 3. The uniﬁcation of AE-schemata. For details, see the main text and, in particular, Appendix A.
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quires a littlemore explanation, since itmay not be readily apparent
how the uniﬁcation of category-neutral schemata can give rise to
(apparently) word category-based combinatory violations. For a
brief illustration, consider the example Das Eis wurde im gegessen
(‘‘The ice cream was in-the eaten’’; from Friederici, 2002), in which
the participle gegessen induces a category violation when it is
encountered after the preposition-determiner amalgamation im.
This violation is typically explained in terms of a phrase structuralmismatch, because a verb cannot follow a preposition plus deter-
miner. In AE-schema terms, however, the explanation is somewhat
different. Here, a determiner such as the is represented as amodiﬁer
for a referential slot within an AE-schema (preferably for the who-
slot in accordwith the actor preference).When a verb form (i.e. a ﬁl-
ler for a what-slot with the AE-schema) is subsequently encoun-
tered, the uniﬁcation requirements for the determiner are not met
and uniﬁcation fails. Hence, increased anterior temporal activation
or an early left anterior negativity (ELAN) results. Essentially, combi-
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and top-down information sources: bottom-up information desig-
nates how likely a schema is to be used for a particular slot (e.g. geg-
essen as a what-candidate via the participial preﬁx ge- and prior
experience with this word form), while top-down information con-
sists in a sequence-based prediction from the dorsal stream (see be-
low) about an upcoming category. Finally, these assumptions
regarding schema uniﬁcation as a source for combinatorial effects
in languageaccounts for the observationof deﬁcits in simple linguis-
tic combinatorics for patients with anterior temporal lesions (Dron-
kers, Wilkins, Van Valin, Redfern, & Jaeger, 2004).
4.2. Combining elements in a time-dependent manner in the dorsal
stream
As outlined in the previous section, we envisage the function of
the ventral stream as one that involves the time-independent (uni-
ﬁcation-based) combination of semantic representations. The dor-
sal stream, by contrast, engages in the time-dependent
segmentation and combination of elements. As is apparent from
Fig. 1, we assume that this comprises (a) the segmentation of the
input into prosodic words, (b) the combination of these elements
into a syntactic structure, and (c) the assessment of the elements
in this structure in action-related terms (‘‘who is responsible for
the event described’’). This characterisation of the dorsal stream
is broadly in line with the following proposal by Scott and Wise
(2004, p. 27): ‘‘[A] stream of processing directed through TpT cor-
tex, including the planum temporale, responsible for encoding and
storing sound sequences and acting as a sensori-motor interface
for mimicry is the ‘how’ system of speech and its acquisition.’’
We disagree, however, with the common view that this stream is
responsible primarily for articulation and repetition, rather than
comprehension of speech and language: as outlined above, many
empirical ﬁndings attest to the fact that language comprehension
draws upon the dorsal stream and that this is the case even in sim-
ple sentences. The solution that we propose is thus as follows: the
dorsal stream indeed processes sound sequences, but does so with-
in both production and comprehension. (For a similar view, see
Wise et al. (2001, p. 92) who posit that the left posterior STS ‘‘tran-
siently represent[s] the temporally ordered sound structure of
words, both heard words (the external source) and words retrieved
from lexical memory (the internal source)’’).
We thus concur to some extent with Saur et al. (2008), who link
the dorsal stream in language comprehension to working memory:
‘‘involvement of the dorsal stream for processing of complex syn-
tactic operations might be partially explained as a result of an in-
crease in syntactic working memory load’’ (Saur et al., 2008, p.
18039). In contrast to Saur and colleagues (and Friederici, 2009),
however, we do not view complexity of the sentences in question
as a prerequisite for the involvement of the dorsal stream. There
are at least three reasons for this claim:
(a) Working memory is always required when a sequence of
more than two elements is processed in time. Current
assumptions about working memory suggest that only one
element (the most recent) remains in the focus of attention,
while all less recent items must be retrieved from memory
(for reviews, see Jonides et al., 2008; McElree, 2006). There
is compelling evidence that this general mechanism also
applies during sentence comprehension (e.g. Martin & McEl-
ree, 2008; McElree, Foraker, & Dyer, 2003; Van Dyke & McEl-
ree, 2006) and even in very simple sentences. Notably,
Wagers and McElree (2011) show that displacement from
the focus of attention occurs even within phrases, e.g. when
a noun is separated from a determiner by a modifying adjec-
tive (as in the risk-taking burglar). There is no evidence todate that the retrieval mechanisms involved in phrase-level
processing of this type differ from those required for com-
plex sentences. Moreover, there is no principled reason as
to why such a difference should exist; rather, it is the dichot-
omy between focus of attention and retrieval that manifests
itself across the board.
(b) A similar argument holds for syntactic operations. In all
existing theories of grammar, syntactic mechanisms are
identical between ‘‘simple’’ and ‘‘complex’’ sentences (i.e.
complex sentences may involve an increased number of iter-
ations of these operations, but not the application of qualita-
tively different principles). Thus, there is no theoretical
linguistic basis for the dichotomy between simple and com-
plex syntax (for detailed discussion, see Schlesewsky &
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, 2013).
(c) As already noted in Section 3.3, there is no operationalised
deﬁnition for when a sentence counts as complex as
opposed to simple. Thus, there is no principled way of pre-
dicting whether a given sentence should require dorsal
stream involvement or not. This introduces the danger of cir-
cularity, namely the inference that a sentence must be com-
plex if it engenders dorsal pathway activation.
The assumption that sentence comprehension generally in-
volves the dorsal stream in addition to the ventral stream thus fol-
lows from (a) and solves problems (b) and (c). If this is the case,
then how are the mechanisms underlying sentence comprehension
in the dorsal pathway to be envisaged? In this regard, we will dis-
cuss the three functions shown in Fig. 1 in turn.
4.2.1. Prosodic segmentation of the input
A number of existing ﬁndings attest to the involvement of pos-
terior temporal regions within the dorsal pathway in prosodic seg-
mentation. For example, Meyer, Steinhauer, Alter, Friederici, and
von Cramon (2004) reported that activation in the posterior STG
and the planum temporale is modulated by intonational properties
(listening to normal versus ‘‘ﬂattened’’ speech). Similarly, Ische-
beck, Friederici, and Alter (2008) observed increased activation in
Heschl’s gyrus, mid to posterior STG and the rolandic operculum
for the processing of sentences with two as opposed to one intona-
tional phrase boundary. Posterior temporal and parietal regions
have further been implicated in the processing of speech rhythm
(Geiser, Zaehle, Jancke, & Meyer, 2008), an information source
which is known to be important for the segmentation of the speech
stream into words (e.g. Cutler & Norris, 1988), in the discrimina-
tion between speech and non-speech sounds based on temporal
modulations of the input (Zaehle, Geiser, Alter, Jancke, & Meyer,
2008), and in auditory stream segregation (Cusack, 2005).
4.2.2. Syntactic structuring
Let us now turn to what will likely be the most controversial as-
pect of our present proposal, the assumption that syntactic struc-
ture building relies upon posterior temporal regions as part of
the dorsal stream and, accordingly, that syntax is neither associ-
ated with the aTL nor with the IFG. Our initial motivation for enter-
taining this assumption was theoretical: Recall that standard
assumptions regarding the involvement of the lIFG in syntactic
processing appear problematic from the perspective that (a) syntax
is processed early in all existing models of sentence comprehen-
sion (see Section 3.1), and (b) assuming hierarchical processing
as a basic neurobiological property (see Rauschecker & Scott,
2009, and Section 2.1), syntactic structuring should be more prox-
imate to primary auditory areas than the lIFG. Situating syntactic
structure-building within the temporal lobe solves both of these
problems and is highly compatible with the notion that frontal cor-
tex is a region for conﬂict resolution and cognitive control rather
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syntactic structure-building forms part of the dorsal as opposed
to the ventral stream further guarantees separable functions for
dorsal versus ventral stream processing (namely time-dependent
computations versus time-independent identiﬁcation of auditory
objects, respectively), while at the same time allowing for func-
tionally uniﬁed interpretations of processing within each stream.
It thereby solves the remaining puzzles, namely ‘‘What is the func-
tion of the ventral stream?’’ (3.2) and ‘‘(Why) do we need a dorsal
stream for language comprehension?’’ (3.3).
In accordance with our cross-linguistically motivated view of syn-
tactic structure as logically independent of sentence-level interpreta-
tion (for review, see Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, 2009b),
we assume that syntactic structure-building involves the establish-
ment of structured sequences of linguistic categories. The resulting
structures are simple, binary-branching and do not involve syntactic
movement. For further details on the structures themselves and how
they are established incrementally, see Appendix B.
The claim that syntactic structure building is accomplished by
posterior temporal regions is, in our view, supported by several
empirical ﬁndings (though the authors’ original interpretations of
these ﬁndings were, in some cases, quite different). In an fMRI
study on sentence and word list processing in Dutch, Snijders
et al. (2009) contrasted category-ambiguous words with unambig-
uous words in sentence contexts or as part of a word list. They rea-
soned that main effects of ambiguity across both tasks would be
indicative of lexical retrieval, while effects of ambiguity for sen-
tences only should be observable in regions responsible for syntac-
tic structure building (uniﬁcation in their approach). In the left
posterior middle temporal gyrus (lpMTG), they observed an inter-
action between ambiguity and task, which was due to an ambigu-
ity effect (higher activation for ambiguous versus unambiguous
conditions) in sentence but not word list processing. This result
is fully compatible with our proposal, since category-ambiguous
words give rise to multiple potential structuring options and high-
er activation of regions involved in structure-building is therefore
to be expected.11 In a subsequent study using the same task, Snij-
ders, Petersson, and Hagoort (2010) further demonstrated effective
connectivity between the lpMTG and posterior lIFG, thus supporting
the assumption of dorsal stream involvement. For language produc-
tion, too, it has been suggested that posterior temporal regions may
be involved in the linearisation of elements, i.e. in determining the
linear order of syntactic constituents (Ye, Habets, Jansma, & Münte,
2011). This is an integral part of syntactic structure building.
Further recent results support the proposed dissociation between
syntactic structure building as category sequencing within the dorsal
streamandAE schemauniﬁcation as the basis for sentence interpreta-
tion within the ventral stream. In an fMRI study on French, Pallier,
Devauchelle, andDehaene (2011) contrasted 12-itemword sequences
with increasing constituent sizes (i.e. from a word list of 12 single-
word constituents to a single constituent consisting of 12words) using
both real French words and pseudowords. As predicted by our pro-
posal, increasing constituent sizes correlated with increasing activa-
tion in both the posterior temporal lobe (posterior superior temporal
sulcus, pSTS) and the aTL. For the pSTS, we would attribute the in-11 Snijders et al. (2009) in fact found a very similar pattern of results in left inferior
frontal cortex. We propose that this inferior frontal activation can be attributed to the
increased demands on cognitive control that arise when an ambiguous category
needs to be integrated into a sentence (for a proposal linking ambiguity, cognitive
control and the lIFG, see January et al., 2009; Novick et al., 2005) rather than from
syntactic structure building (uniﬁcation) as assumed by Snijders and colleagues. Note
that the assumption of syntactic structuring in the temporal portion of the dorsal
stream in combination with control processes in frontal cortex provides a principled
explanation why both loci should show activation in a task of this kind, while an
account positing that the inferior frontal activation reﬂects structure building does
not.creased activation to iterative sequencing demandswithin a constitu-
ent as opposed to across constituents (where no predictions can be
made for the next category). The aTL activation, by contrast, wewould
attribute to increasing AE-schema uniﬁcation demands with increas-
ing constituent size. Crucially, however, only AE-schema uniﬁcation
relies on semantically contentful representations, thus leading to the
prediction that such uniﬁcation demands should only be observable
for elements that can be associated with (an) existing AE-schema(ta)
(see the discussion of Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011, above). Indeed, Pallier
et al. (2011) found that,while the correlation between constituent size
and the magnitude of the BOLD response was independent of the real
word/pseudoword distinction for the pSTS, it was only observable for
realwords for theaTL (aSTSandtemporalpole, TP). This resultprovides
strong converging support for our proposal.
4.2.3. Understanding the action described
The ﬁnal role that we envisage for posterior temporal regions
within the dorsal stream is to provide a bridge to action-understand-
ing systems in the brain. In language comprehension, the posterior
portion of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) has been linked to
competition for actorhood in the sense of Appendix A: the higher
the degree of competition for the actor role within a sentence, the
higher the activation observed within this region (Bornkessel-Schle-
sewsky & Schlesewsky, 2009b; Grewe et al., 2007). Increased activa-
tion within the pSTS is also observable when assumptions about
which sentence participant is the actor need to be reanalysed, e.g.
due to the particular properties of a verb encountered in the
clause-ﬁnal position (Bornkessel et al., 2005). Importantly, the pSTS
and neighbouring temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) have also been
linked to the processing of agency information in non-linguistic con-
texts (Frith & Frith, 1999) and to the inference of others’ intentions or
states of mind (Saxe, 2006). In conjunction with the sensitivity of the
pSTS for other cues such as biological motion, these observations
have led to the suggestion that the pSTS/TPJ region is crucial for ac-
tion understanding. The fact that actor-inference in language pro-
cessing also correlates with activation in this region suggests that it
may constitute an important interface between the neural language
and action understanding systems.
These assumptions tie in well with the proposal that the dorsal
‘‘how’’ stream is linked to mimicry (see the quote by Scott & Wise,
2004, above). Within the scope of the eADM, we have posited that
the cross-linguistic importance of the actor rolemay be due to the fact
that the basic actor prototype is the ﬁrst person singular, i.e. the self
(Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, in press-a, in press-b; for
the assumption of the self as an agent prototype, see also Dahl, 2008;
Tomasello, 2003). Thus, identifying an actor and determining its typi-
cality (i.e. its statusasagoodorbadactor)maycrucially involveassess-
ing thesimilarityof a sentenceparticipant to the self as anactingagent.
Within the present proposal, the position of the actor-identiﬁca-
tion/action-understanding step as the ﬁnal mechanism of under-
standing within the temporal part of the dorsal stream follows
from the fact that a sentence participant’s position within a sentence
is one of several cues to actorhood. In English, this cue is extremely
important, since the ﬁrst participant in a subject–verb–object se-
quence must always be interpreted as the actor (for empirical evi-
dence, see MacWhinney, Bates, & Kliegl, 1984). In other languages,
position is not as important a cue; it nevertheless still plays a role
in view of the language processing system’s endeavour to identify
the actor as quickly as possible. Indeed, even languages with a con-
siderably more ﬂexible word order than English consistently show
an actor-ﬁrst preference during incremental language comprehen-
sion (for reviews, see Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky,
2009b; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, in press-a, in press-
b). Thus, syntactic structure building in the sense outlined above –
namely, determining the sequential order of categories within
successively larger syntactic constituents (see also Appendix B and
(A)
(C)
(B)
(D)
Fig. 4. Syntactic structures assumed within the current approach. Lexical categories (terminal nodes), e.g. noun (N), verb (V), determiner (D), are depicted in italics. All other
category labels are arbitrarily chosen in order to reﬂect the cross-linguistically indeterminate nature of categories at the phrasal and sentential levels. In English, for example,
the processing of an initial determiner plus noun (noun phrase) may give rise to the expectation for a verb plus dependent elements (verb phrase; see D), while no such
expectation is possible in the majority of languages (see, for example, Haider, 2010, for German).
I. Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, M. Schlesewsky / Brain & Language 125 (2013) 60–76 71Fig. 4) – is a crucial prerequisite to actor identiﬁcation even though it
is not the only determining factor for this operation.
In summary, we propose that the dorsal stream engages in
time-dependent computations during sentence comprehension.
As these types of computations are required for all linguistic con-
stituents of a size that exceeds a single word, they are assumed
to apply to all types of sentences, irrespective of their assumed
complexity. As in the ventral stream, processing adheres to the
fundamental principle of hierarchical organisation, with process-
ing successively further downstream from PAC serving to compute
successively more complex representations: prosodic chunking is a
necessary prerequisite for syntactic structure building (category
sequencing), which, in turn, is a necessary information source for
actor identiﬁcation. Thus, both streams share crucial characteris-
tics, but differ with regard to the types of computations that they
perform in the comprehension process.1212 An architectural consequence of these assumptions is that there are, indeed, only
two macroscopically diverging processing streams, the overarching functions of
which can be described – in the speech and language domain – as time-dependent
sequence processing (dorsal stream) and time-independent identiﬁcation of auditory
objects (ventral stream). Crucially, though we have focused exclusively on speech and
language here, we assume that these characterisations are compatible with the
domain-general functions of the two streams (i.e. with regard to information
processing of any kind). Furthermore, while we would not want to exclude the
possibility that, in addition to anatomical subpathways, there are also functional
substreams within each stream, the present account predicts that these should
conform with the assumed overarching functions of their respective stream.4.3. Converging streams: the role of frontal cortex
As already discussed in detail above, one crucial component of
the present proposal is that frontal cortex (and particularly the
lIFG) does not perform any linguistic processing proper. Rather,
all language-inherent processes (though these need not necessarily
be speciﬁc to language) are assumed to take place within the tem-
poral (and parietal) regions that form part of the dorsal and ventral
streams.13 The role of frontal cortex, by contrast, is assumed to be
related to cognitive control and conﬂict resolution, following a pro-
posal by Thompson-Schill and colleagues (e.g. Novick et al., 2005;
Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Thompson-
Schill et al., 2005). Part of this control-based mechanism is, in our
view, to bring together the different representations generated by
the dorsal and ventral streams,14 i.e. the time-independent semantic
representation (ventral; see Fig. 3) with the time-dependent and ac-
tor-related structure (dorsal; see Fig. 4) as a prerequisite for action13 While we have not discussed parietal regions here, we assume that they play an
important role in linking individual sentences to the broader discourse via further
relational categories at the sentence level and an interaction with attentional systems
(Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, in press-a, in press-b).
14 We thus agree, to some degree, with Hagoort’s (2005) proposal that the lIFG plays
a crucial role in the integration of information from different linguistic domains. In
contrast to Hagoort, however, we do not assume that processing within a domain (e.g.
syntactic structuring or uniﬁcation of semantic representations) is accomplished in
inferior frontal regions. These aspects of processing are all accomplished within
temporal/parietal regions in the present account.
17 In this particular example, the uniﬁcation failure results from the interplay of top-
down information (the expectation for a verb based on the previous processing of the
wh-pronoun within the dorsal stream) and bottom-up information (the experience-
based information that subway is not typically used as a ‘‘what’’ category in the sense
of an AE-schema in English) in combination with the preceding wh-pronoun.
18 Interestingly, both of these studies point to a correlation between the anterior
(rather than the posterior) temporal lobe and syntactic comprehension deﬁcits (e.g. in
the processing of non-actor-initial sentences Magnusdottir et al., 2012). At a ﬁrst
glance, this might appear problematic for our proposal. However, recall ﬁrst of all that
sentence-level semantic interpretation is associated with AE-schema uniﬁcation in
our account, thus rendering an association between comprehension deﬁcits and the
aTL expected. There are several possibilities as to how the precise deﬁcits observed
might come about. On the one hand, as noted in Appendix A, AE-schema uniﬁcation
proceeds according to a number of non-syntactic heuristics, e.g. degree of association
between different schemata and the preference to ﬁll the actor (who) slot in
accordance with the actor-oriented nature of the schemata. This could very plausibly
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assume that cognitive control mechanisms in frontal cortex are
structured in a hierarchical anterior-to-posterior gradient (from
frontopolar to premotor cortex),15 with more anterior regions per-
forming control mechanisms that draw upon successively more re-
mote information (Koechlin & Summerﬁeld, 2007; Koechlin et al.,
2003). We have recently proposed that this control gradient can also
be applied to language processing such that successively more ante-
rior regions within the gradient correlate with control operations for
linguistic information units of increasing scope, i.e. from single
word-based information up to pragmatic appropriateness (Bornkes-
sel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, 2012; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky
et al., 2012). In accordance with Koechlin and colleagues’ proposal,
this means that less local (more anterior) control signals can over-
ride more local (more posterior) ones in determining action planning
and execution. Thus, pragmatic requirements can override literal
meaning, for example, as in the contextually appropriate interpreta-
tion of It’s rather cold in here as a request to close the window. This
perspective of hierarchically structured cognitive control processes
in lateral frontal cortex in addition to linguistic processing proper
in temporal/parietal regions has a number of advantages:
(a) It allows for top-down feedback based on the convergence of
both streams, which can modulate the processing of the next
input item (word). For example, as already noted brieﬂy in
Section 4.1, the prediction for an upcoming word category
that stems from syntactic structuring within the dorsal
stream can be used to constrain AE-schema uniﬁcation for
the next word within the ventral stream, speciﬁcally
whether an element is assumed to play a predicating
(‘‘what’’) or a referential (‘‘who’’ or ‘‘with whom’’) role.
(b) It can explain seemingly paradoxical observations regarding
the hierarchical structure of language comprehension mech-
anisms. As already pointed out in Bornkessel-Schlesewsky
et al. (2012), the proposal that pragmatic information can
override more local linguistic information – as required by
the frontal gradient – does not appear compatible with
observations about the timing of language processing. How-
ever, this problem can be overcome if one assumes that lin-
guistic processing per se takes place in regions other than
the inferior frontal cortex and only the frontal control pro-
cesses apply according to this hierarchy. The same logic
can be applied to explain the following apparent paradox
regarding the relation between basic combinatory opera-
tions and semantic interpretation. On the one hand, neuro-
linguistic ﬁndings suggest that, when a word category
cannot be integrated into the current sentence context, this
blocks subsequent semantic integration (i.e. an early left-
anterior negativity, ELAN, ‘‘blocks’’ an N400, see Friederici,
2002).16 Nevertheless, we can understand sentences involving
a category error and interpret them as action instructions: for
example, when addressed by a tourist with ‘‘Please, where
subway?’’, we can point him/her in the direction of the next
subway station in spite of the category error that is induced
by the fact that the wh-pronoun is not followed by a verb. This
follows straightforwardly from the present proposal. The
absence of an N400 following an ELAN results from the fact
that both semantic integration and basic combinatorics are15 Possibly, premotor cortex should be viewed as playing a dual role, namely: (a) in
the dorsal pathway’s auditory-to-motor mapping, and (b) as part of frontal control
structures. The extent to which these two functions can be dissociated empirically
remains an interesting question for future research.
16 For a detailed discussion of why ﬁndings of an N400 preceding an anterior
negativity when the semantic processing problem can be recognised prior to the
category violation (van den Brink & Hagoort, 2004) are not a counterexample to this
claim, see Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky (2009a) and Footnote 5.aspects of AE-schema uniﬁcation within the ventral stream
(see Section 4.1). When schema uniﬁcation fails,17 no seman-
tic integration takes place between the different schemata.
Thus, the ventral stream passes unintegrated schema repre-
sentations on to frontal cortex, where (i) conﬂict resolution
is attempted; and (ii) interpretation proceeds following gen-
eral communicative requirements as applied to the associated
schema representations. This can lead to action execution, e.g.
giving appropriate instructions to the tourist, even though the
dorsal stream has failed to produce a coherent output.
(c) Conﬂict resolution, as described under (b), is viewed as
involving the IFG irrespective of the linguistic domain that
is involved in generating the conﬂict. This is in line with
recent ﬁndings showing that syntactic and spelling viola-
tions both lead to increased lIFG activation, i.e. that the lIFG
does not appear to show a specialisation for particular lin-
guistic domains in conﬂict resolution (van de Meerendonk,
Indefrey, Chwilla, & Kolk, 2011).
(d) It is compatible with a range of observations on deﬁcit-
lesion correlations in language comprehension. While an
association between Broca’s region and syntax was long
propagated on the basis of reports of agrammatism in Bro-
ca’s aphasics (e.g. Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; see also Grodzin-
sky, 2000), it is empirically highly problematic. Firstly, there
is no one-to-one correlation between a diagnosis of Broca’s
aphasia and a lesion in Broca’s region (e.g. Caplan, 2000;
Dick & Bates, 2000). Secondly, and relatedly, symptoms
related to agrammatism have been reported for a range of
aphasic syndromes and lesion sites (e.g. Caplan, 2000; Dick
& Bates, 2000; Penke & Wimmer, 2012), thus leading Dick
and Bates (2000, p. 29) to conclude that ‘‘this proﬁle has
absolutely no localizing value’’. Thirdly, recent studies
employing voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM,
Bates et al., 2003) to examine correlations between lesion
site and linguistic performance in relatively large samples
of patients point to temporal rather than inferior frontal
lesions as detrimental to syntactic aspects of language com-
prehension (English: Dronkers et al., 2004; Icelandic: Mag-
nusdottir et al., 2012).18
On a ﬁnal note, we would like to point out that the top-down
feedback mechanism based on frontal cortex is only one of two
feedback mechanisms assumed within the present framework.result in deﬁcits in the comprehension of non-actor-initial sentences - irrespective of
any purported levels of syntactic complexity. On the other hand, deﬁcits of this type
could result from disruptions in intra-temporal lobe connectivity, i.e. between
anterior and posterior temporal regions. A prediction of our account is that successful
language comprehension requires a binding of the time-sensitive representations
computed within the postero-dorsal temporal pathway with the time-independent
representations computed within the antero-ventral temporal pathway. In addition to
relying on the integrational role of frontal cortex, this could potentially be
accomplished by intra-temporal interactions, assuming that the appropriate ana-
tomical connections exist.
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the temporal parts of the dorsal and ventrals pathways within the
present paper, we assume that these connections are bidirectional
as well. In contrast to the feedback via frontal cortex, however,
which we assume to apply across items (i.e. from one word to
the next), intra-temporal feedback can occur within items (i.e.
within the same word) as well (see also Footnote 16). The neuro-
anatomical basis for this intra-temporal connectivity will need to
be speciﬁed in more detail in future research.
5. Summary and conclusion
In the present paper, we have outlined a new framework for
sentence comprehension within the dorsal and ventral streams
based on an extension and neuroanatomical speciﬁcation of the ex-
tended Argument Dependency Model (Bornkessel & Schlesewsky,
2006) in conjunction with well-established principles of neurobio-
logical organisation such as hierarchical processing within the
auditory system (Rauschecker, 1998; Rauschecker & Scott, 2009).
By proposing that language-inherent processing mechanisms are
conﬁned to the temporal lobe (and possibly the parietal lobe,
though this was not discussed here), with frontal regions only
accomplishing more general aspects of cognitive control in the ser-
vice of action planning and execution, we have resolved a number
of theoretical and empirical puzzles within the existing dorsal–
ventral streams literature. Speciﬁcally, we have addressed previous
incompatibilities between time and space and inconsistencies in
the speciﬁcation of dorsal and ventral stream functions. While
we acknowledge that the present proposal will need to be spelled
out in a greater degree of neuroanatomical detail in the future, we
believe that it provides a promising initial step forward in the
endeavour to model the relationship between language and the
brain at the sentence level and above.
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Appendix A. Actor-event (AE) schemata: properties and
uniﬁcation
In the following, we describe the AE-schemata posited here in
more detail. To this end, we ﬁrst motivate the properties of cate-
gory neutrality and actor-centredness, which characterise the
schemata themselves (Appendix A.1), before going on to describe
the mechanisms of schema uniﬁcation (Appendix A.2).
A.1. Properties of AE-schemata
As noted in the main text, we assume that AE-schemata are cat-
egory neutral and actor-centred. Both of these characteristics will
be motivated in detail in the following.
Category neutrality posits that AE-schemata are not speciﬁed
lexically for a particular word category (part of speech). This means
that the ‘‘paint’’ schema in Fig. 2, for example, equally applies to
the verb to paint and the noun painter. In the verb case, the ‘‘what’’
part of the schema, which describes the action or state of affairs, is
relevant; in the noun case, by contrast, it is the ‘‘who’’ part of the
schema, i.e. the person or thing performing the action or impli-
cated in the state of affairs. The motivation for assuming category
neutral schema of this type is threefold. Firstly, the long-held
assumption that word categories such as noun or verb are impor-
tant organising categories in the neural representation of languageis not supported by the overall set of ﬁndings on this question. Spe-
ciﬁcally, category differences do not manifest themselves at the
word level when meaning is controlled for (for review, see Vig-
liocco, Vinson, Druks, Barber, & Cappa, 2011) and only emerge in
speciﬁc sentence contexts. Vigliocco and colleagues interpret this
observation as being most compatible with an emergentist view
of lexical categories, according to which categories are not lexically
speciﬁed but rather emerge from the combination of different
types of constraints. (These include: semantic prototypicality
(nouns prototypically refer to objects and verbs to actions); distri-
butional cues (nouns and verbs tend to occur in different sentence
environments); morphological cues (nouns and verbs tend to differ
with regard to the way in which they are marked grammatically);
phonological typicality (there are subtle phonological differences
between nouns and verbs).) Secondly, a similar argument can be
made on the basis of cross-linguistic observations, since not all lan-
guages show a lexical distinction between different word classes,
i.e. some languages allow for the same lexemes to be used as
‘‘verbs’’ and as ‘‘nouns’’ as is the case for category-ambiguous
words (e.g. cut, train) in English (for a recent review, see Bisang,
2010). For this reason, many cross-linguistic approaches to word
categories are also emergentist in nature (e.g. Croft, 2001). In sum-
mary, the category neutrality of the AE-schemata assumed here is
compatible with psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic results on
the processing of different word categories; it is also adequate
for describing lexical semantics across languages.
Thirdly and ﬁnally, by representing an action and its corre-
sponding actor using the same schema, AE-schemata naturally al-
low for a derivation of the ‘‘actor-action compatibility effect’’, i.e.
the fact that, during language comprehension, we tend to expect
that participants will perform an activity that is congruent with
their own identity (Corrigan, 2001, 2002). For example, a noun that
is negatively biased (e.g. murderer) is more likely to be interpreted
as the causer of an event that shows a similar bias (e.g. harass) as
opposed to a positively-biased event (e.g. praise). This compatibil-
ity between actor and action is inherent to the formulation of our
AE-schemata, since actor and action are deﬁned as mutually inter-
dependent. (For more details on how this property affects schema
uniﬁcation, see section A.2 below.)
A.1.1. Actor centrality
The assumption of actor-centred event schemata is based on a
generalisation observed in studies of sentence comprehension
across a range of typologically diverse languages. In languages as
diverse as German, Turkish, Chinese, Hindi and Tamil, the language
comprehension system attempts to identify the person/thing pri-
marily responsible for the state of affairs being described (the ‘‘ac-
tor’’) as quickly and unambiguously as possible (for reviews, see
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, 2009b, in press-a). This re-
sults in a preference for both actor-initiality and actor prototypi-
cality, i.e. the ﬁrst sentence participant encountered is
interpreted as the actor if at all possible, even in languages in
which the notions of actor and grammatical subject do not overlap;
and atypical (e.g. inanimate) actors engender a cross-linguistically
comparable response. As argued in detail in Bornkessel-Schlesew-
sky and Schlesewsky (2009b), this overall pattern of results can be
explained if we assume that sentence participants compete for the
actor role. Accordingly, AE-schema uniﬁcation also involves an ac-
tor preference such that a participant will be preferentially inte-
grated into the ‘‘who’’ (i.e. actor) slot if this slot is not already ﬁlled.
A.2. AE-schema uniﬁcation
Here, we illustrate how AE-schema uniﬁcation allows for
semantic combinatorics at the phrasal and sentential levels on
the basis of several examples. To this end, we will discuss both
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verb-ﬁnal structure in German . . .dass der Maler das Mädchen küs-
ste (lit: that the painter (NOM) the girl (NOM/ACC) kissed, ‘‘. . . that
the painter kissed the girl’’). For ease of illustration, we only dis-
cuss the uniﬁcation of noun phrases (NPs) and verbs here, glossing
over the details of how determiners (e.g. the) and nouns are com-
bined to form NPs (for the representation of a determiner, see
Fig. 2D).
Example 1: The painter kissed the girl. When the ﬁrst NP is pro-
cessed, the AE-schema for paint (Fig. 2A) is activated (AE-schema
identiﬁcation in Fig. 1). Via positional information, it is interpreted
as a referent rather than a predicate. The positional information is
provided top-down from frontal cortex based on the syntactic
structure that has already been built up; see Section 4.3. In the case
of a sentence-initial constituent as in the present case, the context
is null and thereby leads to a preference for a referential rather
than predicative interpretation (we assume that the human lan-
guage processing system universally prefers referent (or noun
phrase) initial structures, as reﬂected, for example, in the fact that
only a small proportion (approximately 10%) of the world’s lan-
guages show a verb-initial basic word order; Dryer, 2005). Follow-
ing schema identiﬁcation, a propositional representation is set up
by means of uniﬁcation (AE-schema uniﬁcation in Fig. 1). This is
achieved by unifying the ‘‘paint’’ schema with itself, i.e. by unifying
one instance of the schema with the who-position of another in-
stance of the schema (see Fig. 3A). This uniﬁcation step reﬂects
(a) the preference for the initial participant to be interpreted as
an actor, and (b) the actor-action compatibility preference, i.e.
the tendency to expect a particular actor to perform a semantically
compatible action (e.g. for a painter to paint). Once the second con-
stituent, kiss, is encountered, the AE-schema in 2C is activated and
identiﬁed as a predicative usage via the past tense morpheme (-ed)
and sentential position (following an initial noun phrase). While
the morphological cue is processed bottom-up within the ventral
pathway, since morphemes are also auditory objects, the positional
cue is again a top-down cue from frontal cortex. In the ensuing
schema uniﬁcation step, the schema in 2C (kiss) needs to be uniﬁed
with the schema in 3A (the painter). This requires that the action
representation do’(x(paint’(x,y)) is replaced with do’(x(kiss’(x,y)),
resulting in 3B. While this involves an initial uniﬁcation conﬂict, it
is resolved rather easily since the overall event structure is highly
compatible between the two actions and only the type of activity
needs to be replaced. This is in line with previous results showing
that preverbal constituents are used to set up (a) expectations about
the particular lexical nature of the verb (i.e. paint is more likely in the
context of painter than kiss, e.g. Kutas, DeLong, & Smith, 2011) and
(b) expectations about verb class (Bornkessel, Schlesewsky, & Fried-
erici, 2003; Bornkessel et al., 2005; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schle-
sewsky, 2008b; Demiral, 2008). Finally, when the second argument
(the girl) is encountered, it is uniﬁed into the ‘‘with whom’’-position
of the active schema in 3B, yielding 3C.
Example 2: . . .dass der Maler das Mädchen küsste (lit: ‘that the
painter the girl kissed’). Here, the ﬁrst noun phrase is processed ex-
actly as in English. When the second constituent is encountered, it
is integrated into the with whom-position of the schema in 3A,
yielding 3D. Subsequently, when the clause-ﬁnal verb is reached,
schema 2C is uniﬁed with 3D, again requiring the replacement of
do’(x(paint’(x,y)) with do’(x(kiss’(x,y)) and thus again yielding 3C.
Thus, as is apparent from these simple examples, the uniﬁcation
of AE-schemata accounts for the processing of sentences with dif-
ferent verb-argument orders in a homogeneous fashion and ex-
plains how both verbs and arguments can induce predictions
about upcoming constituents (for predictability based on verbs,
see for example, Altmann & Kamide, 1999; for predictability based
on arguments, see Bornkessel et al., 2003, 2005; Bornkessel-Schle-
sewsky & Schlesewsky, 2008b; Demiral, 2008).Appendix B. Syntactic structure-building
We envisage the mechanisms of syntactic processing as shown
in Fig. 4. As is apparent from the ﬁgure, we assume simple, binary-
branching structures without any kind of syntactic movement
(note, for example, that the subject- and object-initial sentences
shown in Fig. 4B and C have exactly the same structure apart from
the order of subject and object). These types of structures are com-
patible with a range of assumptions in various grammatical theo-
ries, including Merge and Bare Phrase Structure from Chomskyan
generative grammar (Chomsky, 1995, 2000) as well as the notion
of ‘‘surface true’’ constituent structures without movement in ap-
proaches such as Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin, 2005),
Simpler Syntax (Culicover & Jackendoff, 2005) and Lexical Func-
tional Grammar (Bresnan, 2001).
Fig. 4D shows how incremental structure building works. In
particular, it demonstrates how a binary branching structure re-
sults as a natural byproduct of processing the words in a sentence
as a temporal sequence. We assume that the category labels shown
in the ﬁgure are the result of an emergentist learning procedure
(see Section 4.1), in which a speaker of a particular language learns
to associate particular word forms in that language with particular
syntactic environments. These distributional constraints on the
environment in which particular types of words occur can further
be used to set up predictions for upcoming categories (as shown in
Fig. 4D). These are transferred to frontal regions along the dorsal
stream, from where they can be used in a top-down fashion to con-
strain the function (e.g. predication versus reference) of an AE-
schema during uniﬁcation within the ventral stream. Crucially,
the position of a word or phrase within the structures shown in
Fig. 4 does not determine the interpretation of that word or phrase.
There is, for example, no designated ‘‘subject’’ position which could
be taken as evidence for a noun phrase to be interpreted as the
instigator of an event (the actor). Sentence-level interpretation is
exclusive to AE-schema uniﬁcation within the ventral stream.References
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